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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Article focuses on the interpretations of, and changes relating
to, oil, gas, and mineral law in Texas from November 2, 2007,
through November 1, 2008. The cases examined include decisions
of state and federal courts in the State of Texas and the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.1
* Attorney at Law, Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas (www.bf-law.com).
1. This Article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas, and mineral law decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states are
not included. Page limitations of this publication required the omission of some cases of
interest. See Bowden v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 247 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. 2008) (class certifica-
tion based on different types of royalty clauses); Americo Energy Res., L.L.C. v. Moore,
No. 13-08-00097-CV, 2008 WL 3984169 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Aug. 29, 2008, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (a pipeline must be removed if it is a trespass); GP II Energy, Inc. v. Chamber-
lain, No. 14-07-00237-CV, 2008 WL 4354931 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 26,
2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (risk of acting as escrow agent under a Purchase and Sale Agree-
ment); Osage Envtl., Inc. v. R.R. Comm'n, No. 03-08-00005-CV, 2008 WL 2852295 (Tex.
App.-Austin July 24, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (a Railroad Commission permit is re-
quired to dispose of drill bit cuttings); Shoreham Oil & Gas Co., Inc. v. State, 260 S.W.3d
249 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.) (plugging liability to the State is based on Form P-
4); W.L. Lindemann Operating Co., Inc. v. Strange, 256 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2008, pet. denied) (risks of commingling oil production and the proof of intent re-
quired); Hlavinka v. Hlavinka, No. 13-06-00041-CV, 2008 WL 2151527 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi May 22, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (the term of a term interest is calculated
from the date of the correction deed); Corine, Inc. v. Harris, 252 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 2008, no pet.) ("heirs and assigns" in a reservation refers to rights of inheritance
and alienability); DSTJ, L.L.P. v. M & M Res., Inc., No. 09-07-559CV, 2008 WL 659571
(Tex. App.-Beaumont Mar. 13, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (rule of capture and injunc-
tion for drainage on adjoining tracts); Valence Operating Co. v. Texas Genco, LP, 255
S.W.3d 210 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, no pet.) (Accommodation Doctrine and directional
drilling); Endeavor Natural Gas, L.P. v. Magnum Hunter Prod., Inc., No. 13-06-352-CV,
2007 WL 4340870 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Dec. 13, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (alloca-
tion of severance tax refunds under an assignment that allocated rights which accrued
before and after the effective date).
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II. TITLE AND CONVEYANCING ISSUES
Silver Oil & Gas, Inc. v. EOG Resources, Inc. is a boundary dispute
case resolved by the assumption that the surveyor did not intend to over-
lap a senior survey.2 Silver brought suit based on its contention that
EOG's wells were located too close to the boundary line between
Surveys 9 and 10, Block Q5.3 A simplified sketch illustrates the dispute
between the parties:
Filler Surveys
_ 117 1/2 9 10 Q
Q5 Q
Pecos Known 12
iver ( Corner Q6
222.45 varas short
Section 116, Block 1 to the west and Sections 9 and 12, Block Q6 to the
east were the senior surveys. In between were the filler surveys, which
filled the gap between the senior surveys. Therefore, Sections 117 1/2,
Block 1 and Sections 9 and 10, Block Q5 were junior surveys.4 All three
surveyors who testified at the trial agreed that the original surveyor made
an error of 222.45 varas when he re-surveyed Survey 116, Block 1.5 The
error "affected the total east-west distance of the junior surveys, so that
the called distances along the southern line of the junior surveys ex-
ceeded the distance actually available between the senior surveys. '"6 Sil-
ver contended that the correct boundary between Sections 9 and 10,
Block Q5 was 222.45 varas east because the sections should start at the
known corner and be laid out in order. EOG contended that the bound-
ary was correctly located by a distance call back from Block Q6. 7
The trial court ruled for EOG. 8 Silver claimed the following errors
were made by the trial court:
(1) adopting a construction that impermissibly shortens a senior sur-
vey; (2) failing to locate the surveys in question from the nearest
2. 246 S.W.3d 197, 200-02 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.).





8. Id. at 202.
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established corner; (3) locating the surveys from an unmarked prai-
rie line; and (4) granting to EOG Resources and TEMA lands that
were sold to Silvers predecessors more than a century ago [i.e., Silver
claimed under the senior patent]. 9
The San Antonio Court of Appeals determined that the standard of
review was "sufficiency of the evidence" because there were fact issues
behind each surveyor's opinion. 10 What constitutes boundaries is a ques-
tion of law, but determining where the boundaries are upon the ground is
a question of fact."I When determining the location of boundary lines in
a survey, the applicable cardinal rule is that the footsteps of the original
surveyor should be followed, if they can be ascertained, even if they are
inconsistent with the calls and references in the surveyor's field notes.12
"However, if the location of the actual footsteps of the surveyor cannot
be established with reasonable certainty, all of the surrounding facts and
circumstances should be considered in order to arrive at the purpose and
intent of the surveyor who made the original survey."'1 3 All of the court's
analysis appears to be driven by its primary assumption that the original
surveyor did not intend to overlap the Q6 senior survey.
Because the trial court's judgment did not resolve any issue pertaining
to the location of the survey lines in Section 116, the court found that a
junior survey was not used to shorten or change the boundary lines of the
senior survey of Section 116.14
Silver argued that the court should have used the nearest known corner
to locate the surveys. Although the location of the southwest corner of
Survey 117-1/2 was undisputed by the parties, the acreage used by the
original surveyor to make the distance calls for the filler surveys was af-
fected by the mistake in Survey 116. As a result, the certainty of the
corner's location would not be useful in determining the location of the
filler surveys. 15 Therefore, the trial court's decision to work back from
the senior survey to the east was justified.1 6
Unmarked prairie lines (like the 06 line) are not ordinarily used to
locate other surveys. However, calls for adjoinder will prevail even if ad-
joinder is with an unmarked but ascertainable line.17 Exceptions exist in
the event the call for adjoinder was made "upon misapprehension, mis-
take, or conjecture."' 8 The adjoinder call in this case was not a mistake
because the surveyor intended for the surveys to adjoin line Q6 and to
account for the full amount of available acreage; he was mistaken as to
9. Id. at 199.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 202-03.
12. Id. at 204 (citing TH Invs., Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine, L.P., 218 S.W.3d 173, 204
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied)).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 204-05.
15. Id. at 205.
16. Id. at 204.
17. Id. at 205 (citing Frost v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 433 S.W.2d 387, 396 (Tex. 1968)).
18. Id. (citing Turner v. Smith, 122 Tex. 338, 61 S.W.2d 792, 800 (1933)).
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the amount of acreage available because of the error in Survey 116.19
Because the Q6 line was an ascertainable line, the trial court's decision to
rely upon it was not erroneous. 20
Silver argued that Section 9 was patented to its predecessors forty years
before Section 10 was patented to the predecessors of EOG.21 However,
the court held that "[t]he survey and location of the land determines the
rights of the parties, not the issuance of patents. '22
Determining the original surveyor's intent is the cardinal rule used in
locating boundary lines.23 EOG successfully argued that the intent to ad-
join with the Q6 line was paramount; therefore, fixing the boundary by
the call west from the Q6 line was proper.24 The significance of the case
appears to be the great weight given to the presumption that the surveyor
did not intend to overlap a senior survey. Because an illegal location
(e.g., too close to a lease line) generally means that there is no right to
produce the well at the illegal location, boundary locations can be critical
in oil and gas operations.
Longoria v. ExxonMobil Corp. reviewed party joinder issues in the
context of trespass to try title and declaratory judgment claims.25 The
claims were based on adverse possession prior to the severance of the
surface and mineral estates. Longoria and forty-one other plaintiffs
claimed an interest in 9,200 acres based on the adverse possession of the
tract by Jose M. Longoria, his brother and sister-in-law beginning in 1898.
The underlying dispute involved an alleged fraudulent deed in 1919 and a
1924 partition suit that did not name the Longorias as parties. The
Longoria plaintiffs originally claimed an undivided one-half interest in
the surface and the minerals in the entire 9,200 acres.26 Longoria sued in
trespass to try title and for a declaratory judgment against eleven oil and
gas companies, which leased over 6,700 acres, and Lopez, who was un-
leased and owned approximately 1,016 acres in fee. Longoria did not sue
the surface owner, the other unleased mineral owners, the royalty own-
ers, the non-participating royalty owners, or the owners of the possibility
of reverter under the oil and gas leases.2 7
There was a protracted fight over joinder and various motions to dis-
miss and amendments to the pleadings. 28 The trial court eventually dis-




22. Id. (citing Allen v. Draper, 254 S.W. 783, 784-85 (Tex. Comm'n App., holding ap-
proved), modified, 256 S.W. 255 (1923); Ashby v. Ringstaff, 464 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
23. Id. at 204.
24. Id. at 205.
25. 255 S.W.3d 174, 178-79 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. denied).
26. Id. at 177-78.
27. Id. at 178 & n.1.
28. Id. at 179.
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join absent mineral owners."'29 After considering the application of
Rule 39 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 30 and the discretion given
to the trial court as to matters of joinder and in determining dismissals,
the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed. 31
The trial court's discretion is governed by Rule 39:
Rule 39(a) provides that a person who is subject to service of process
shall be joined as a party to an action if: (1) his presence is needed to
adjudicate the dispute and accord complete relief to those already
parties; (2) his ability to protect his interests may be impaired or im-
peded if he is absent; or (3) his absence leaves one already a party
subject to a substantial risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations.32
Although expressed in mandatory terms, it is left to the trial court to
determine whether an absent person falls within the rule.3 3 Rule 39 is
applicable to both trespass to try title and declaratory judgment claims.34
In their attempt to avoid dismissal, the Longorias amended their plead-
ings to claim that joinder of additional parties was not required.35 They
made no claim to the surface estate, and they claimed only those minerals
owned and possessed by parties who were named as defendants. Royalty,
non-participating royalty, and the possibility of reverter are each non-
possessory interests. The Longorias claimed that they were unleased co-
tenants and stipulated they would be burdened by the royalties otherwise
payable by the named defendant oil and gas company lessees. 36 The
Longorias argued that the possibility of reverter had "no real ascertaina-
ble value" and that the unjoined mineral owners would not be prejudiced
by a judgment which was not binding on them.37 In other words, the
Longorias narrowed their claim to the leasehold interests of the named
defendant oil and gas companies and the fee mineral interest of Lopez.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that "the fact an absent person
does not have title to or possession of the minerals to which the
Longorias seek title is not dispositive if the relief the Longorias seek
could impair the person's ability to protect any interests he claims." 38
The court emphasized that a person must be joined if, as a practical mat-
ter, the disposition might "impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest. '39 The court noted that a judgment in this case could "impair
the absent lessors' ability to convey the royalty interests and possibilities
of reverter they claim to own,"' 40 and a declaration that the 1924 judg-
29. Id.
30. TEX. R. Civ. P. 39(a), (b).
31. Longoria, 255 S.W.3d at 184.
32. Id. at 179 (quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 39(a)).
33. Id. at 180.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 181.
36. Id. at 179.
37. Id. at 181.
38. Id. at 182.




ment was void, "even if not technically binding on the absent lessors, roy-
alty interest owners, and owners of the unleased mineral estate, would
cloud their title."41
The Longorias relied heavily on two Texas Supreme Court cases,
Brooks v. Northglen Association42 and Clear Lake City Water Authority v.
Clear Lake Utilities Co.,4 3 to support their claim that the trial court
abused its discretion. 44 The court of appeals rejected that argument and
distinguished the supreme court cases cited as limited to whether it was
fundamental error for the trial court to proceed without the absent parties
in those cases.45 The defendants in those supreme court cases failed to
raise the issue of joinder at the trial court level, so the issue on appeal was
not judicial discretion under Rule 39, but rather lack of jurisdiction based
on fundamental error. 46 Although the trial court was not deprived of ju-
risdiction in those cases, the trial court could be required to join those
same parties if the issue was timely raised under Rule 39 in the trial
court.47 "When, as here, the necessity of joining additional parties has
been raised in the trial court, 'the fact that the decree would not be tech-
nically binding on the absent party is not the controlling factor."' 48
"When the trial court determines a person falls within the provisions of
Rule 39(a) and is subject to service of process, he must be joined."'49
Because the Longorias were given the opportunity to join the addi-
tional parties but made no attempt to do so, the court held Rule 39(b)
was not applicable.50 Rule 39(b) only governs the analysis of trial court's
discretion in proceeding when parties cannot be joined.51 Here, there
was nothing in the record to show that the absent parties could not be
joined.52
The case is significant because it carefully analyzes the narrow grounds
upon which the failure to join parties is not a reversible error in the su-
preme court opinions. It is authority for the premise that all owners
should be joined in trespass to try title and declaratory judgment actions
affecting title.53 However, the trial court's discretion is very broad, and
that discretion may produce different results on similar facts. 54 In apply-
ing Rule 39(a), "there is no arbitrary standard or precise formula for de-
41. Id.
42. 141 S.W.3d 158 (Tex. 2004).
43. 549 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1977).




48. Id. (citing Royalty Petroleum Corp. v. Dennis, 160 Tex. 392, 332 S.W.2d 313, 317
(1960)).




53. Id. at 183.
54. Id. at 182.
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termining whether a particular person falls within its provisions. '55
Range Resources Corp. v. Bradshaw examines whether the grantor of
an interest in minerals reserved a "fraction of royalty" or a "fractional
royalty."'56 The royalty reservation provided the following:
[1] The Grantors herein reserve unto themselves, their heirs and as-
signs, and except from this conveyance an undivided one-half (1/2)
Royalty (Being equal to not less than an undivided one-sixteent[h] (1/
16)[)] of all the oil, gas and/or other minerals in, to, and under or that
may be produced from said ... land ....
[2] Said interest hereby reserved is a Non-Participating Royalty...
provided, however, that all such leases shall provide for Royalty of
not less than one-eighth (1/8)....
[3] In the event oil, gas or other minerals are produced from said
land, then said Grantors, their heirs and assigns, shall receive not less
than one-sixteenth (1/16) portion (being equal to one-half (1/2) of the
customary one-eighth (1/8) Royalty) of the entire gross production
and/or such net proceeds as hereinabove provided. . .. 57
The owner of the non-participating royalty interest contended the in-
terest reserved was one-half "of royalty," and the mineral owners con-
tended the interest reserved was a fixed one-sixteenth of production. The
Fort Worth Court of Appeals construed the reservation language in the
deed to create a "fraction of royalty" instead of a "fractional royalty.158
To reach its conclusion, the court examined the four corners of the deed
to ascertain the intent of the parties.59 The court noted that each para-
graph contained "not less than" language. 60 The parenthetical language
found in paragraph 1 states that the reserved share of production was to
be "equal to not less than an undivided one-sixteent[h]." 61 The court in-
terpreted this to express the intent to establish a minimum one-sixteenth
share of production, rather than a fixed share of production. 62
Paragraph 2 provides that all leases "shall provide for Royalty of not
less than one-eighth (1/8)."63 The court found that, when the first two
paragraphs were read together, it was evident that the parties contem-
plated future leases would be executed on the property and that royalty
rates in subsequent leases might vary.64 However, regardless of the roy-
alty, the language found in paragraph 2 ensures the grantor that the re-
55. Id. at 180 (quoting Cooper v. Tex. Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200, 204 (Tex.
1974)).
56. 266 S.W.3d 490, 491 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. filed).
57. Id. at 493-94 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 497-98.
59. Id. at 493 (citing Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991); Bennett v.
Tarrant County Water Control & Imp. Dist. No. One, 894 S.W.2d 441, 446-47 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1995, writ denied)).
60. Id. at 496.
61. Id. at 493.
62. Id. at 495-96.
63. Id. at 494.
64. Id. at 495-97.
2009] 1323
SMU LAW REVIEW
tained royalty interest would be calculated on at least a one-eighth
royalty.65 When the court read paragraph 2 with the parenthetical in par-
agraph 1, the court determined that the clauses worked together to en-
sure that the grantor would be entitled to at least a one-sixteenth share of
production.66
Paragraph 3 provides that the grantor is entitled to receive "not less
than one-sixteenth (1/16) portion (being equal to one-half (1/2) of the cus-
tomary one-eighth (1/8) Royalty) . . . of the entire gross production. 6 7
Like the other paragraphs, the "not less than" language requires that the
grantor receive a minimum of one-sixteenth of production. 68
A "fractional royalty" is a fixed fractional amount of oil and gas, while
a "fraction of royalty" is a fractional amount that is determined upon the
execution of some future lease.69 The court determined that by using
"not less than" language, the royalty calculation was not intended to be
fixed.70 The court concluded that because the parties intended that the
royalty was not to be fixed, the reserved interest could not be a "frac-
tional royalty," and, therefore, one-half "of royalty" was reserved by the
grantor. 71
The significance of the case is that it continues the resurgency of the
"four corners" rule as the rationale for interpreting cases similar to Range
Resources.
III. LEASE AND LEASING ISSUES
Veritas Energy v. Brayton Operating Corp. held that marking the loca-
tion of a proposed lease road will not preserve a lease that requires that
drilling operations be commenced before the expiration of the primary
term.72 The lease required that operations be commenced on or before
the expiration of the primary term and defined "operations" as:
for and any of the following: drilling, testing, completing, reworking,
recompleting, deepening, plugging back or repairing of a well in
search for or in an endeavor to obtain production of oil, gas, sulphur
or other minerals, excavating a mine, production of oil, gas, sulphur
or other mineral, whether or not in paying quantities. 73
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals stated that the threshold issue was
whether the lessee performed "drilling or for drilling" operations within
the meaning of the lease before the expiration of the primary term.74 The
65. Id. at 496.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 494.
68. Id. at 496.
69. Id. at 493.
70. Id. at 495-96.
71. Id.
72. No. 13-06-061-CV, 2008 WL 384169, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Feb. 14,
2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
73. Id. at *1.
74. Id. at *2.
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case centered on whether back dragging of grass with a back hoe to mark
the location of a road constituted operations within the meaning of the
lease. 75 Ultimately, the court held that those operations did not.76
On June 5, 2003, a dirt work company hired by the lessee used a back-
hoe to back drag grass from the curve in the road on the lessor's property
to the highway area. Later that day, due to rainy conditions, the dirt
work company stopped the activity. On June 6, the primary term expired.
Lessee resumed work on the road on June 9th or 10th, after the primary
term of the lease. 77 After reviewing the facts in many possible prece-
dents, the court found that "in each case where it was found that the lease
extended into its secondary term, there was considerably more activity
toward conducting drilling operations than that undertaken by Veritas [in
this case]."'78 The court also found that the work done to evaluate the
prospect before the lease was acquired and assembling data for possible
investors could not be "operations" that would preserve this lease. 79
The significance of the case is that it adds to the precedents that define
the commencement of operations for purposes of propelling a lease past
the expiration of the primary term and into the secondary term. It sug-
gests, consistent with other precedents, that the test may be more rigor-
ous if there is a requirement for "drilling operations" rather than just
"operations. '80 However, even "drilling operations" is broader than "the
mere cutting of [a] hole." 8'
In AFE Oil & Gas, L.L.C. v. Armentrout, the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals held that a Barnett Shale gas well that had not been fraced by
the end of the primary term was not capable of producing gas at the time
shut-in royalties were paid. 82 Lessee began operations on the well on
July 30, 2003.83 The primary term expired on August 1, 2003. The lease,
as amended, could be continued in force for up to ninety consecutive days
without actual production if operations were being conducted on the land
or if the well was capable of producing and was shut in for no more than
ninety days. 84 The well was shut in on August 5, 2003.85 In August, the
well was acid perforated, a technique used to stimulate production of a
gas well, and apparently some gas did flow.86 Lessee attempted to pay
shut-in royalties to lessor in October 2003. Lessee fraced the well in No-
75. Id. at *1.
76. Id. at *5.
77. Id. at *4.
78. Id.
79. Id. at *4 n.3.
80. Id. at *5.
81. Id. (citing Reid v. Gulf Oil Corp., 323 S.W.2d 107, 115 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1959), affd, 337 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Tex. 1960)).
82. No. 2-07-100-CV, 2008 WL 623980, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Mar. 6, 2008,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).
83. Id. at *1.
84. Id. at *3.
85. Id.
86. Id. at *1, *3.
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vember 2004.87 Lessor refused to accept the shut-in royalty payment and
brought suit for lease termination.88
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals stated:
To avoid forfeiture of the lease, most gas leases allow for the lease to
be extended even if the well is not producing gas if shut-in royalties
are paid and the well is actually capable of producing gas. In other
words, if further work on the well is required before the well will be
capable of producing gas, then even paying shut-in royalties will not
prevent the termination of the lease. The term "capable of produc-
tion" has been held to mean capable of producing gas in paying
quantities where the lease does not define the term.89
The parties contested the issue and produced conflicting testimony on
whether the well could produce natural gas at the time the shut-in royal-
ties were paid. Lessee contended that "capable of production" means
that gas will flow when the well's switch is turned on.90 Lessee presented
evidence that in August 2003, there was a quantity of gas in the well and
that the operator's daily reports showed there was gas flowing during this
period of time. 91
Lessor offered evidence from several sources that gas wells in the Bar-
nett Shale will not produce without fracture stimulation. 92 At the end of
the primary term, lessee had only performed an acid perforation (an en-
tirely different procedure), and the well had not been fraced. Lessor also
supplied expert testimony indicating that a month after the lessee's No-
vember 20, 2004, frac job, the well was still not capable of production. In
addition, lessor's expert testified that the well could not be turned on or
begin to flow on either August 5, 2003, the date the well was shut-in, or in
October 2003, when the shut-in royalty payments were tendered to
Lessor.93
The issue was submitted as follows:
The trial court thus submitted this question to the jury: "Do you find
that in October, 2003, the Armentrout No. 2 Well was not capable of
producing gas?" The trial court instructed the jury that a well is not
capable of producing gas if the well needs further work, repairs, or
equipment in order to produce gas. The jury sent a note to the trial
judge asking, "[M]ust the gas be able to flow in order to be consid-
ered 'producible'?" The judge then submitted this supplemental in-
struction: "In response to your question, you are instructed that in
order for a gas well to be 'capable of producing gas'; the gas must be
able to flow." The jury found that the well was not capable of pro-
ducing gas, and the trial court entered final judgment for [lessor]. 94
87. Id. at *3.
88. Id.
89. Id. at *2 (footnotes omitted).
90. Id.
91. Id. at *5-6.
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The court of appeals found the evidence was sufficient to support the
jury's finding that the well was not capable of producing gas at the time
the shut-in royalty payments were made.95
The significance of this case is that the lessee relied heavily on
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson96 to argue that "capable of pro-
duction" required only that "gas will flow when [the well's] switch is
turned on."' 97 However, the jury's finding was that gas would not flow,
and, at least in this case, the well had to be fraced before a shut-in royalty
payment could hold the well. 98
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust held that damages for
drainage by hydraulic fracturing are precluded by the rule of capture
when the only result of the operation is that the oil or gas migrates more
easily to another tract.99 However, if the operation results in actual in-
jury (damage to the reservoir or to an offsetting well), there may be lia-
bility,1°° and the rule of capture will not "shield misconduct ... without
commercial justification."101 The case is also important for its holdings
on the standing of mineral owners in trespass and drainage cases 102 and
the measure of damages in drainage cases.10 3
Lessor owned the mineral interest in a 748 acre tract in Hidalgo
County called "Share 13." Coastal was the Lessee in Share 12, Share 13,
and Share 15, which were adjoining. Coastal eventually acquired the fee
interest in Share 12, so that Coastal also owned the royalty interest in that
tract.104 Of the three wells Coastal drilled between 1978 and 1983, two of
them were productive: the M. Salinas No. 1 and M. Salinas No. 2V. In
1994, Coastal drilled the M. Salinas No. 3 on Share 13, which was an
exceptional producer.105
The M. Salinas No. 3 was located approximately 1,700 feet from Share
12. The Pennzoil Fee No. 1 was the closest well on Share 12 to the
M. Salinas No. 3. In 1996, Coastal drilled the Coastal Fee No. 1 on
Share 12 as close to Share 13 and the M. Salinas No. 3 as the Texas Rail-
road Commission's statewide spacing rules permitted. 10 6 Coastal then
shut in the Pennzoil Fee No. 1 but later drilled the Coastal Fee No. 2 on
Share 12 close to Share 13. Lessor believed that Coastal was allowing gas
to be drained from Share 13, on which Coastal owed Lessor a royalty, to
the wells on Share 12 where Coastal was entitled to the gas unburdened
by any royalty obligations. Lessor sued Coastal for breach of its implied
95. Id. at *1.
96. 94 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. 2002).
97. AFE Oil & Gas, 2008 WL 623980, at *3.
98. Id. at *4-5.
99. 268 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tex. 2008).
100. Id. at 11.
101. Id. at 17.
102. Id. at 10-11.
103. Id. at 19-20.
104. Id. at 5.




covenant to develop Share 13 and to prevent drainage. Coastal promptly
drilled eight wells on Share 13 within fourteen months. 10 7 When Coastal
formed a gas unit including parts of Share 12 and Share 13, Lessor added
a claim for bad-faith pooling to Lessor's lawsuit for breach of the implied
covenant to develop and protect. 10 8
The Vicksburg T formation was the productive formation under both
Share 12 and Share 13. It is a "tight" sandstone formation from which
natural gas cannot be commercially produced without hydraulic fracture
stimulation (fracing). All the wells on Shares 12 and 13 were completed
in the Vicksburg T formation and fraced. Lessor also added a claim for
trespass to its lawsuit, which alleged that Coastal's fracing of the Coastal
Fee No. 1 on Share 12 invaded the reservoir beneath Share 13, resulting
in substantial drainage of gas from Share 13. There was evidence that the
frac job on the Coastal Fee No. 1, when compared to the other wells, was
"massive."10 9 The parties agreed that the hydraulic and propped lengths
of the frac crossed the lease line, but they presented conflicting expert
opinions on whether the effective length of the frac crossed the lease
line. 01 Lessor won a jury verdict on all of its claims."'I
The Texas Supreme Court had not previously decided whether subsur-
face fracing can give rise to an action for trespass, and its opinion in this
case did not fully resolve the issue.112 For many years, hydraulic fracture
stimulation has been a very common practice. The trial court judgment
against Coastal, of approximately $15,000,000, combined with the fear in
the industry that this very common industry practice would now be sub-
ject to a significant legal risk, generated intense interest and a blizzard of
amicus briefs.1 13 For the past several years, this case has probably been
the most visible oil and gas case working its way through the judicial
system.
The general expectation was that the supreme court would have to de-
cide whether subsurface fracing was or was not a trespass. However, the
supreme court determined it did not have to decide this broad issue.1 14
Actionable trespass requires an injury, but Lessor's only claim of injury
was that Coastal's fracing operation made it possible for gas to flow from
beneath Share 13 to the Share 12 wells. Under the rule of capture, there
were no damages because the gas Lessor claimed to have lost simply did
not belong to Lessor.1 15 "That rule gives a mineral rights owner title to
the oil and gas produced from a lawful well bottomed on the property,
even if the oil and gas flowed to the well from beneath another owner's
107. Id.
108. Id. at 7-8.
109. Id. at 7.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 8.
112. Id. at 11-12.
113. Id. at 17 n.56.
114. Id. at 12.
115. Id. at 12-13.
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tract."'1 16 Therefore, Lessor did not prove any recoverable damages (such
as actual damage to Lessor's wells or to the reservoir) caused by the frac
operation. 117
This case does not completely remove the risk of trespass by subsurface
frac because the supreme court carefully distinguished potential liability
attributable for actual damages to an offsetting well or to the reservoir.118
Furthermore, the rule of capture will not "shield misconduct that is ille-
gal, malicious, reckless, or intended to harm another without commercial
justification.' 19 Although not clearly foreclosed, the remaining risks of
liability for subsurface trespass by frac appear to be based on conduct
causing actual damages, not the nominal damages of a trespass, and those
risks fall within conventional existing tort theories of liability, such as
negligence.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Willett wrote that he would find that
there was simply no trespass, rather than there were no damages. 120 In
his opinion, trespass is a court-defined doctrine, and the court should re-
fine that definition to hold that a frac is not a trespass.' 2 ' He found the
issue to be indistinguishable from the secondary recovery water flood,
which the court permitted in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Manziel,1 22
except that the water flood was arguably more invasive and inflicted
greater and more irreversible damage than fracture stimulation. 123 The
dissent would not consider whether the rule of capture precluded dam-
ages until it was first determined whether hydraulically fracturing across
lease lines is a trespass.' 24 The dissent found that the gas did not migrate
naturally to Coastal and that a frac was essentially indistinguishable from
a slant hole trespass.' 25 In any event, until the trespass issue is decided,
Coastal's frac must be illegal because the jury found it was a trespass.' 26
Therefore, given that the production was illegal, the rule of capture did
not apply because the rule only applies to gas that can be legally
produced. 127
The supreme court characterized Lessor's claim that the rule of capture
did not apply as an argument that the rule should be changed.'2 8 The
supreme court found "four reasons not to change the rule of capture to
allow one property owner to sue another for oil and gas drained by hy-
draulic fracing that extends beyond lease lines."'1 29 "First, the law already
116. Id. at 13.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 17.
120. Id. at 29-30.
121. Id. at 36.
122. 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962).
123. Coastal, 268 S.W.3d at 36-37.
124. Id. at 42.
125. Id. at 42, 44.
126. Id. at 43.
127. Id. at 42-43.
128. Id. at 13.
129. Id. at 14.
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affords an owner who claims drainage full recourse" (self-help drilling,
counter-fracture stimulation, offer to pool, force pool, and Commission
regulations). 130 "Second, allowing recovery for the value of gas drained
by hydraulic fracturing usurps to courts and juries the lawful and prefera-
ble authority of the Railroad Commission to regulate oil and gas produc-
tion.' 31 The law of trespass should not take over the Commission's
role.132 "Third, determining the value of oil and gas drained by hydraulic
fracturing is the kind of issue the litigation process is least equipped to
handle."'1 33 When litigating recovery for drainage resulting from fracing,
trial judges and juries cannot take into account critical factors such as
social policies, industry operations, and the greater good. 134 Also, mate-
rial facts are hidden below miles of rock, thus making discovery of the
events difficult. 135 "Fourth, the law of capture should not be changed to
apply differently to hydraulic fracturing because no one in the industry
appears to want or need the change."'1 36
The supreme court did support Lessor's claim of standing. 137 Coastal
sought to defeat Lessor on jurisdictional grounds because trespass is ulti-
mately an injury to the right of possession, and a royalty owner, like Les-
sor, has no right of possession. The supreme court held that this
definition of trespass was over-simplified. 138 Assuming Lessor could
show more than a mere trespass-meaning actual, permanent harm to
the property to affect the value of the royalty or the reversion-then Les-
sor has standing.139
The supreme court also reviewed Lessor's claims for breach of the im-
plied covenant to protect against drainage, breach of the implied cove-
nant to develop, and bad-faith pooling. 140 "Coastal had an implied
obligation to act as a reasonably prudent operator to protect Share 13
from drainage."14' Although it noted Coastal failed to meet this obliga-
tion, the jury was instructed to calculate damages by "the value of the
royalty on the gas drained from Share 13 by the subsurface trespass by
the Coastal No. 1 fracing operation."1 42 The court had previously held
that the correct measure of damages was the "offset royalty formula,"
i.e. the amount of royalties the drained lessor would have received from
the offset well. 143 However, the lessor would be overcompensated if pro-
130. Id.
131. Id. at 14-15.
132. Id. at 14-16.




137. Id. at 10.
138. Id. at 9-10.
139. Id. at 10.
140. Id. at 17.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 17-18.
143. Id. (citing Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton, 133 S.W.3d 245, 253 (Tex. 2004)).
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duction from the offset well was greater than the drainage. 144 There is
also a line of cases holding that the correct measure of damages is a roy-
alty on the "amount drained away.' 1 45 However, this measure would
also overcompensate the lessor if some of the drainage could not have
been prevented. 146
The correct measure of damages for breach of the implied covenant
of protection is the amount that will fully compensate, but not
overcompensate, the lessor for the breach-that is, the value of the
royalty lost to the lessor because of the lessee's failure to act as a
reasonably prudent operator. 147
The supreme court also cited with approval the statement, "[t]he measure
of damages for breach of the drainage covenant is the royalty interest on
the production lost by the producer's failure to prevent drainage."' 148 Ab-
sent any evidence in this case of the proper measure of damages, Lessor
could not recover against Coastal on Lessor's claim for breach of the pro-
tection covenant. 149
Coastal also had an implied obligation to continue to develop Share 13
with reasonable diligence after the M. Salinas No. 3 was completed. Les-
sor claimed to have lost interest income because royalties were not paid
to Lessor sooner. Coastal offered evidence showing that the delay actu-
ally benefitted Lessor because the price of gas increased over time. 150
For breach of the development covenant, the lessor is entitled to recover
"the full value of royalty lost to him.' 1 51 The parties agreed that the
question of whether Lessor suffered a loss from the delay was not a sim-
ple interest calculation but depended on price and production rates.
Coastal argued that the jury should have been instructed to find the dif-
ference between the value of what Lessor received and what should have
been received, which Coastal believed should be zero. The supreme
court found some evidence to support the jury's verdict, but the issue was
generally moot because this part of the case was remanded for a new trial
on other grounds.1 52 Similarly, the supreme court found that there was
some evidence to support the jury's finding of bad faith pooling, but this
issue was also remanded on other grounds. 53
The significance of the case is that now there are only a few unusual
circumstances that might support liability for subsurface trespass by hy-
draulic fracture stimulation. The rule of capture generally trumps tres-
144. Id. at 18.
145. Id. at 18 n.60.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 18-19.
148. Id. at 19 n.62 (citing Mandell v. Hamman Oil & Ref. Co., 822 S.W.2d 153, 164 (Tex.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1991, writ denied)).
149. Id. at 19.
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Tex. Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 481, 6 S.W.2d 1031, 1038
(1928)).




pass. Operators can continue to do business as usual. If the frac
operation damages the neighbor's well or the reservoir, then the opera-
tion will result in liability. A royalty owner has standing to sue for this
kind of claim. The measure of damages in a drainage case has now been
clarified as "the amount that will fully compensate, but not overcompen-
sate, the lessor for the breach-that is, the value of the royalty lost to the
lessor because of the lessee's failure to act as a reasonably prudent
operator. "154
IV. INDUSTRY CONTRACTS
Navasota Resources, L.P. v. First Source Texas, Inc. construed the pref-
erential right to purchase provision in the 1989 Model Form Operating
Agreement (M.F.O.A.) as applied to a package sale.1 5 5 The holder
(Holder) of the preferential right (Right) sued the working interest own-
ers and the purchasers of a portion of the working interest (Owners) to
enforce the Right. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of
the Owners. 156 The Waco Court of Appeals rendered judgment in favor
of the Holder on the claims for breach of contract and specific perform-
ance, and it remanded the cause to the trial court to determine attorney's
fees and any lost revenue since the exercise of the Right. 157
The Right in this case was found in a standard A.A.P.L. 1989 M.F.O.A.
joint operating agreement (JOA) covering a Contract Area referred to as
the "Hilltop Prospect." 158 The JOA contained the following form
provision:
Should any party desire to sell all or any part of its interest under this
agreement, or its rights and interests in the Contract Area, it shall
promptly give written notice to the other parties, with full informa-
tion concerning its proposed disposition, which shall include the
name and address of the prospective transferee (who must be ready,
willing and able to purchase), the purchase price, a legal description
sufficient to identify the property, and all other terms of the offer.
The other parties shall then have an optional prior right, for a period
of ten (10) days after the notice is delivered, to purchase for the
stated consideration on the same terms and conditions the interest
which the other party proposes to sell .... 159
Under the terms of the proposed transaction between Gastar Explora-
tion, Ltd. (Gastar) and Chesapeake Energy Corporation and its affiliate,
Chesapeake Exploration Limited Partnership (Chesapeake), Chesapeake
would (1) purchase a percentage of Gastar's outstanding shares of com-
mon stock, (2) enter into a thirteen-county area of mutual interest with
Gastar (AMI), (3) pay $5,012,933 for one-third of Gastar's net leasehold
154. Id. at 18-19.
155. 249 S.W.3d 526 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, pet. denied).
156. Id. at 528-29.
157. Id. at 544.
158. Id. at 529.
159. Id. at 529-30.
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acreage that was subject to the JOA, and (4) pay 44% of the costs
through casing point on certain test wells in order to earn a 33.33% work-
ing interest. 160 On October 18, 2005, the Owners sent the Holder a letter
informing them of the Chesapeake deal and giving the Holder the oppor-
tunity to exercise its preferential right to purchase by (1) paying
$5,012,933 for one-third of Gastar's net leasehold acreage that was sub-
ject to the JOA and (2) paying 44% of the costs through casing point on
certain test wells in order to earn a 33.33% working interest.161 On Octo-
ber 21, the Holder notified the Owners of its intent to exercise its prefer-
ential right. Later the same day, the Owners sent a second letter to the
Holder that stated the October 18, 2005, letter was erroneous; therefore,
the Owners were rescinding the original notice letter. A second notice
letter was sent to the Holder two days later, and it stated that, in order for
the Holder to exercise its preferential right to purchase, it must comply
with every aspect of the agreement, i.e., the stock purchase, the thirteen-
county AMI, the cash price, and the promoted carry. The Holder refused
to accept the "modified" offer and brought suit.162
The court first considered the fundamental question of whether a pref-
erential right to purchase can be triggered by a package sale.163 The
transaction clearly involved properties that were not subject to the
JOA. 164 According to the majority rule, a third party's offer to purchase
property as part of a package sale, subject to a preferential right provision
involving multiple properties or a larger tract of land, does not invoke the
preferential right provision.1 65 Texas courts, on the other hand, have al-
most uniformly followed the line of cases that holds that a preferential
right is invoked by a package sale. 166 In this case, the court followed the
minority rule and held that the first proposal invoked the Right because
the proposal included the sale of the Owners' working interest in acreage
that was subject to the JOA. 167
Given that the Right was invoked, the court then had to determine
whether the Holder was required to purchase shares of common stock or
enter into the thirteen-county AMI to exercise its Right. 16 8 The Right in
the JOA stated that a party who desires to exercise the Right "must agree
to purchase the interest being sold 'on the same terms and conditions' as
a third party has agreed to purchase that interest. '169 The Owners ar-
gued that the AMI and stock purchase were additional "terms and condi-
tions" for the purchase of the Hilltop Prospect, while the Holder argued
160. Id. at 530.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 531.
163. Id. at 533-35.
164. Id. at 533.
165. Id. (citing Sawyer v. Firestone, 513 A.2d 36, 39-40 (R.I. 1986)).
166. Id. at 534 (citing Brenner v. Duncan, 27 N.W.2d 320, 322 (Mich. 1947)); see also
McMillan v. Dooley, 144 S.W.3d 159, 178-79 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, pet. denied.).
167. Navasota, 249 S.W.3d at 535.
168. Id. at 535-37.
169. Id. at 535.
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that these items were separate transactions included within the deal.170
The court found that "[v]irtually every authority of which we are aware
agrees that the holder of a preferential right cannot be compelled to
purchase assets beyond those included within the scope of the agreement
subject to the preferential right in order to exercise that right.' 71 The
court held that the Owners could not require the Holder to purchase
shares of common stock or enter into a thirteen-county AMI in order to
exercise its Right. 172
The court also reviewed whether the Right placed an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation. Texas courts look to the Restatement of Property
when any alleged restraints on alienation are at issue.173 The court found
that the Restatement directly addressed the issue raised by the Right in
this case, as follows:
If the right to purchase is on the same terms and conditions as the
owner may receive from a third party, if the procedures for exercis-
ing the right are clear, and if the period within which it must be exer-
cised is relatively short, the right of first refusal is valid unless the
purpose is not legitimate. Since the practical effect of the restraint
on alienability is minimal, duration of the first-refusal right should
not affect validity.174
Without exception, Texas courts have upheld preferential right provisions
like the one at issue in this case as reasonable restraints on alienation;
therefore, the court held that the Right was not an unreasonable restraint
on alienation. 175
The Owners argued that awarding the Holder specific performance
would result in the Holder being permitted to exercise its preferential
right with regard to the Hilltop Prospect by paying less than the "true
value" of the Owners' working interest. The Owners put in affidavit evi-
dence that the "true value" was higher, and they argued there was, there-
fore, an issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. 76
The Owners contended that the value of the prospect was substantially
higher than reflected in the notification letter sent to the Holder or the
letter of intent between the Owners and the Holder, but the higher value
was ultimately accounted for in the deal through the stock purchase and
AMI.a77 The court found that while some courts in other jurisdictions
agree, the only Texas cases addressing this issue follow the rule that "the
seller should be held to the allocated price absent affirmative evidence of
170. Id.
171. Id.; see also McMillan, 144 S.W.3d at 179.
172. Navasota, 249 S.W.3d at 537.
173. Id. (citing Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Sav. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 811, 813-15 (Tex.
1982)).
174. Id. at 538 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. § 3.4, cmt. f (2004)).
175. Id. at 538-39 (citing Perritt Co. v. Mitchell, 663 S.W.2d 696, 698-99 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
176. Id. at 543.
177. Id. at 540-41.
1334 [Vol. 62
Oil, Gas and Mineral Law
bad faith or of some other improper basis for the allocated price.' 1 78 The
Right in this case does not require the Holder "to pay 'true value' or fair
market value."' 179 The provision "requires only that the holder match the
third-party offer." 180  Thus, the Holder was entitled to specific
performance.181
The significant aspects of the case are the holdings that a package sale
does trigger a preferential right to purchase, that the Holder cannot be
required to purchase some asset other than the property subject to the
Right, and that the allocated price will apply in the absence of bad faith
or of some other improper basis for the allocated price.
In re XTO Resources I, LP held that reserve estimates, recoverable gas
reserve estimates, projected future revenues, and the location of proved
undeveloped acreage and proved developed not producing acreage are
trade secrets.1 82 Trade secrets are privileged from disclosure "if the allow-
ance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work
injustice."' 183 The "party asserting the trade secret privilege has the bur-
den of proving that the discovery information sought qualifies as a trade
secret."1 84
Texas courts rely on the following six-factor test to determine whether
information can be classified as a trade secret:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his busi-
ness; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others
involved in his business; (3) the extent of the measures taken by him
to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the informa-
tion to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money
expended by him in developing the information; [and] (6) the ease or
difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or
duplicated by others. 185
The party claiming a trade secret is not required to satisfy all six factors
because trade secrets do not always meet every factor, and other circum-
stances may be influential to the analysis.186
The Texas Supreme Court in In re Bass held that the 3-D geological
seismic data at issue in the case could be considered a trade secret. 187
XTO presented evidence on all six factors through the means of affidavits
and other evidence that was similar to the situation in In re Bass. The
Fort Worth Court of Appeals ultimately held that the data sought by the
Real Parties in Interest was a trade secret and was protected by Rule
178. Id. at 542.
179. Id. at 543.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. 248 S.W.3d 898, 900 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.).
183. TEX. R. EvID. 507.
184. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 737 (Tex. 2003).
185. Id. at 739 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. B (1939) and RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 reporter's n. cmt. B (1995)).
186. Id. at 740.




In SubISSI Holdings, L.P. v. Hilcorp Energy I, L.P., the San Antonio
Appeals Court held that tendering an assignment and the obligation to
pay were concurrent obligations under a Joint Operating Agreement
(JOA) and that it was not necessary for the assignment to be executed to
trigger the obligation to pay.189 SubISSI and Hilcorp jointly operated
mineral leases pursuant to a valid JOA.190 Hilcorp acquired property
that was inside the Area of Mutual Interest (AMI) described in the JOA,
and Hilcorp offered SubISSI the opportunity to participate in this acre-
age. SubISSI elected to participate, and Hilcorp delivered a letter enclos-
ing three originals of an unexecuted assignment, a bill of sale, and wire
transfer instructions. 191 The JOA provided that if the party receiving the
offer to participate does elect to participate, "'then the Offering Party
shall execute, acknowledge, and deliver to [the receiving party] an assign-
ment thereof . . ., and [the receiving party] shall pay . . . the Offering
Party' the associated purchase price.' 92 Payment was due within thirty
days following the date the assignment was tendered. 193 SubISSI did
nothing for a period of time that exceeded thirty days, and then it at-
tempted to pay Hilcorp. Hilcorp refused to take the money, contending
SubISSI had forfeited its right to participate because it missed the thirty-
day deadline to pay under the JOA. 194 SubISSI argued "that Hilcorp was
obligated to deliver a fully executed assignment before [SubISSI] was obli-
gated to pay" and to trigger the thirty-day clock. Hilcorp argued that the
obligations were mutual covenants and that its tender of an unexecuted
assignment was sufficient. 195
The San Antonio Court of Appeals found that the JOA did not create
a condition precedent that obligated Hilcorp to deliver a fully executed
assignment to SubISSI in order to become entitled to receive payment
from SubISSI. 196 "A condition precedent is an act or event 'that must
occur before there is a right to immediate performance and before there
is a breach of contractual duty." 197 Where the intent of the parties is not
clear, the agreement is interpreted as creating a covenant instead of a
condition. 98 The election to participate was a condition precedent. 199
Electing to participate was required to obligate Hilcorp to assign the in-
188. In re XTO Res. I, LP, 248 S.W.3d 898, 902-05 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, no
pet.).
189. No. 04-07-00674-CV, 2008 WL 2515698, at *3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio June 25,
2008, no pet.) (mem. op.).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at *1.
193. Id.
194. Id. at *2.
195. Id.
196. Id. at *3.
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terest and to obligate SubISSI to pay for the assignment.20 0
However, once this election was made, Hilcorp and SubISSI had con-
current obligations. Once SubISSI elected to participate, Hilcorp "shall
execute, acknowledge, and deliver.., an assignment.. . and [SubISSI]
shall pay.., the associated purchase price." o2 0 ' The court noted that the
JOA "explicitly use[d] the conjunctive word 'and' rather than a temporal
word such as 'then' or 'afterward.'"202 The court found that, based on
the plain language of the JOA, this portion of the agreement created con-
current obligations. 20 3
The court also determined that Hilcorp's delivery of the letter and un-
executed assignment was an acceptable tender triggering SubISSI's
thirty-day period to pay under the JOA. 20 4 The legal definition of
"tender" depends on the agreement's circumstances.
If a contract calls for successive acts,... there is no breach by one if
the precedent act has not been performed by the other; but if the
contract contemplates concurrent acts, it is sufficient to put one party
in default that the other party is ready, willing, and offers to perform
his part of the contract.20 5
After finding that the obligation to pay was a concurrent obligation,
the court found Hilcorp was ready, willing, and had offered to perform.20 6
The letter from Hilcorp provided in part, "after execution return all three
[original assignments] to my attention for further execution and handling.
Hilcorp will return one fully executed original to your attention. ' 20 7 The
court found that this was a clear indication that Hilcorp would "comply
with its concurrent obligation to execute, acknowledge, and deliver" the
assignment. 20 8 Therefore, the letter and the unexecuted assignment was a
sufficient "tender" to trigger the deadlines imposed under the JOA.20 9
The case highlights the importance of strict compliance when exercising
optional rights. "Because an option to purchase property is a unilateral
benefit to the optionee, options must be exercised strictly according to
the terms of the agreement. '210
V. REGULATIONS
Strata Resources v. State, held that (1) the State of Texas was not pre-
cluded from recovering the costs of plugging oil wells because the Texas





204. Id. at *4.
205. Id. (quoting Perry v. Little, 419 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Tex. 1967)).
206. Id.
207. Id. at *5.
208. Id.
209. Id. at *4-5.
210. Id. at *5.
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verted water wells provided a benefit to the landowner, and (2) to chal-
lenge the value the Commission obtained when disposing of an operator's
equipment, an operator must make a claim on the oil-field cleanup fund
pursuant to section 89.086 of the Texas Natural Resources Code.211
The Commission plugged two wells after the operator ignored orders
requiring that the operator bring the wells into compliance or plug
them. 212 However, rather than simply plugging the wells, the State con-
verted the wells to water wells for the benefit of the landowner, without
giving notice to the operator. Finding that the Commission plugged the
wells pursuant to statute,213 the court held that the State was allowed to
seek reimbursement from the operator for plugging the wells.2 14
The crux of the operator's argument was that:
while the Commission had the right to seek reimbursement for fully
plugging the wells, the Commission cannot recover those costs if it
plugs the well in a manner allowing it to be used as a water well-
even when doing so would cost the State less than fully plugging the
well, and yield the added benefit of a water well. 21
5
Finding no support for the operator's position, the court concluded that
the Commission plugged the wells according to the requirements of 16
Texas Administrative Code section 3.14(b)(4) and (5).216 The court
stated that "[t]he fact that the Commission's method of plugging also pro-
vided a benefit to the landowner by converting the wells into water wells
has no bearing on the State's ability to seek reimbursement from the op-
erator ... for plugging the well."
217
The operator also argued that plugging costs could not be imposed be-
cause the State failed to prove the value of the salvaged well-site equip-
ment, which the operator was entitled to offset against plugging costs.2 18
The State contended that the Texas Natural Resources Code "allows, but
does not require, such an offset and that to challenge the value of the
offset," the operator was required but failed "to make a claim on the oil-
field cleanup fund under section 89.086."219
The operator testified that the recognized market value of the salvaged
equipment was "'greatly in excess' of the salvage price set by the Com-
mission. '"220 The court then noted that "lt]o the extent that the Commis-
sion decide[d] to dispose of well equipment, section 89.085 require[d] it to
do so 'in a commercially reasonable manner." 221 The court held that the
211. 264 S.W.3d 832, 845, 847 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.).
212. Id. at 845.






218. Id. at 846.
219. Id. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 89.086 (Vernon 2007).
220. Strata Res., 264 S.W.3d at 846.
221. Id. (citing TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 89.085).
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reasonableness of the salvaged equipment's sale price was irrelevant.222
The operator was required to file a claim on the oilfield cleanup fund
under section 89.086.223 Failing to make such a claim, the operator was
precluded from challenging the reasonableness of the salvage price set by
the Commission.2 24
The significance of the case is the segregation of liability for plugging
costs from the recovery of offsetting salvage costs from the oilfield
cleanup fund and the freedom given to the State to determine how to
plug the well.
Moore v. Jet Stream Investments, Ltd. held that failure to comply with
regulations is not within a lease force majeure clause, but an agreed tem-
porary injunction may change the measure of damages for production by
the trespasser prior to final judgment.22 5 The Texas Railroad Commis-
sion requires operators of oil and gas wells to post financial assurance to
ensure wells are plugged when production ceases. When the Commission
changed its rules in 2002 to require financial assurance from all operators,
many of the very small operators had trouble finding a source for the
required bond or letter of credit. Moore was one of those small operators
who, though reasonably diligent, failed to find a source. When Moore did
not post the required assurance, he was ordered to cease production. Af-
ter about eleven months with no production, Moore finally obtained a
letter of credit, which the Commission accepted, and production re-
sumed. Lessor sued for lease termination.22 6
Moore contended that the lease was preserved by the operation of the
force majeure clause, which provided:
All terms and express or implied covenants of this lease shall be sub-
ject to all Federal and State Laws, Executive Orders, Rules and Reg-
ulations, and this lease shall not be terminated, in whole or in part,
nor Lessee held liable for damages, for failure to comply therewith, if
compliance is prevented by, or if such failure is the result of, any
such Law, Order, Rule or Regulation. 22 7
Moore argued the terms of the force majeure clause did not require the
event be beyond the lessee's reasonable control. Although the phrase
"beyond the reasonable control of the lessee" was missing, the Texarkana
Court of Appeals found that the lease contemplated such a requirement
because the lease required compliance to be prevented by or the result of
a regulation.2 28 The regulation at issue did not compel production to ter-
minate, but merely imposed conditions on producers in order to continue
production.22 9 Because some forms of financial assurance were available,
222. Id. at 847.
223. Id. (citing TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 89.086).
224. Id.
225. 261 S.W.3d 412, 421-22, 429-30 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. denied).
226. Id. at 417, 419.
227. Id. at 420.




"the Texas Railroad Commission's regulation requiring financial assur-
ance did not preclude compliance with the lease ... [and] the regulation
was not a force-majeure event."'230
The court next rejected a series of arguments by Moore claiming that
production on a related tract perpetuated the lease. 231 The lease origi-
nally included 1533.27 acres, and those lands included the "Perry Tract."
It was conclusively established that at the time of trial the Perry Tract was
held by production, but the Perry Tract was apparently included in a par-
tial release executed in 1952.232 Moore contended that production from
any land described in the original lease (for example the Perry Tract) held
the lease. The court disagreed because the original lease had effectively
terminated as to the land partially released, which included the well site
for the producing well.2 33 The court relied primarily upon Ridge Oil Co.
v. Guinn Investments, Inc. 234 Moore first sought to avoid the effect of
Ridge Oil by the terms of the assignment clause in the lease. The lease
included a typical lease assignment provision which provided:
The rights of either party hereunder may be assigned in whole or in
part, and the provisions hereof shall extend to the heirs, successors
and assigns of the parties hereto, but no change or division in owner-
ship of the land, rental or royalties however accomplished shall oper-
ate to enlarge the obligations or diminish the rights of lessee .... 235
Moore also argued that the entirety clause in the lease preserved the
lease as an indivisible operating unit and made the release of some acre-
age irrelevant. Based on the lease's repeated use of the word "hereun-
der," the court held that both concepts only applied to tracts of land still
bound by the lease.236
The lease also contained a version of a fairly common "notice of de-
fault" clause. The clause provided:
In case of cancellation or termination of this lease from any cause,
Lessee shall have the right to retain, under the terms hereof, around
each well producing, being worked on, or drilling hereunder, the
number of acres in the form allocated to each such well under spac-
ing and proration rules issued by Texas Railroad Commission of the
State of Texas, or any other State or Federal authority having control
of such matters; or, in the absence of such rulings; forty (40) acres
around each such well in as near a square form as practicable, and in
the event lessor considers that operations are not being conducted in
230. Id. at 422.
231. Id. at 422-25.
232. Id. at 422 & n.4.
233. Id. at 423-24.
234. 148 S.W.3d 143 (Tex. 2004). In that case, the Ridge Tract and the Guinn Tract
were both covered by the original lease. The parties executed a new lease covering just the
Ridge Tract. The Texas Supreme Court held that production from the Ridge Tract would
not hold the original lease for the Guinn Tract after the new lease was executed on the
Ridge Tract. Id. at 153.
235. Moore, 261 S.W.3d at 423.
236. Id. at 424.
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compliance with this contract, lessee shall be notified in writing of
the facts relied upon as constituting a breach hereof and lessee shall
have sixty (60) days after receipt of such notice to comply with the
obligations imposed by virtue of this instrument. 237
Moore claimed he was entitled to forty acres around each of his two
wells, which were producing when he received notice from the lessor.
The court held the lease terminated, not on the date when Moore re-
ceived notice of termination from the lessor, but approximately eleven
months earlier, when the Commission shut the wells in and the time to
restore production lapsed.238 The fee simple determinable granted by the
lease automatically terminated upon the breach of the special limita-
tion-that production continue in paying quantities. 239 Because there is
nothing the lessee can do to correct the breach, the notice provision does
not apply.240 Although Moore later restored production to some wells,
this was after the lease had already terminated, and, thus, he was not
entitled to any land around the wells.241
The trial court prohibited Moore from recovering his equipment and
from removing the casing.242 The court of appeals held that an "operator
has an implied right to remove leasehold equipment within a reasonable
time of the expiration of the lease, even in the absence of a specific provi-
sion authorizing such removal. '243 Moreover, this specific lease had ex-
press language permitting lessee to remove both equipment and casing
after the expiration of the lease.244 However, the lessee "does not have
the right to remove the casing if the well is producing or the removal
would damage the well. ' 245 Under those circumstances, the lessee ordi-
narily recovers the value of the casing in place, less the cost of removal. 246
When a producer trespasses and extracts oil, gas, or other minerals, the
measure of damages is determined by whether the trespass was in good
faith or bad faith. The measure of damages for good faith trespass is the
value of the minerals less the cost of production. The measure of dam-
ages for bad faith trespass is the value of the minerals without deduction.
If entry is with full knowledge of the adverse claim, the trespass is conclu-
sively presumed to be in bad faith.247 The court of appeals held that les-
sor was estopped from claiming bad faith trespass in this case because
lessor had affirmatively requested that production continue and had
agreed to a temporary injunction requiring Moore to continue to
237. Id. at 425.




242. Id. at 426-27.
243. Id. at 427.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 428.
246. Id.




Force majeure clauses will be enforced as written, and this case illus-
trates the fine distinctions that may be made with the result that the lease
is lost or saved. Here, the lease was saved, if subject to a regulation with
which the lessee could not comply, but only if compliance was "beyond
the reasonable control of lessee," which was implied into the clause.
Once land is released from a lease, whatever happens on the released
land is not likely to have any effect on the unreleased lands still under
lease. The holdings on the right to remove equipment and casing and the
measure of damages for trespass generally follow existing case law. Be-
cause temporary injunctions are common in this context, the possible ef-
fect on the measure of damages resulting from an agreed temporary
injunction is significant.
VI. ETHICS
Kerlin v. Sauceda held that claims of breach of contract, breach of fidu-
ciary duty, and fraud by a non-participating royalty owner against the
mineral owner based on a mineral deed were all barred by limitations. 249
The case addressed fraudulent concealment in the context of a mineral
deed and the duties owed by the mineral owner to a non-participating
royalty owner. Further, the case involved a lengthy and complicated fact
pattern bearing on the ownership of Padre Island. The Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals' opinion published more complete facts in Sauceda v.
Kerlin.250 Simplified, there were ancient title issues related to the Mexi-
can land grant to Padre Island, which was repeatedly disputed by law-
suits, principally in 1902, 1923, and 1940. There were many claimants
with questionable title. In 1937, a lawyer named Kerlin purchased the
Juan Jose Balli title claim to Padre Island from Balli's heirs and devisees.
Lawyer Kerlin hired a local lawyer, F. W. Seabury from Brownsville, to
help him with acquiring the deeds and in the related, complex litigation.
Kerlin represented to the Balli heirs that if Kerlin received something
through the deeds, each Balli heir would receive a one-sixty-fourth roy-
alty. Kerlin acquired eleven deeds from various Balli heirs. Seabury
drafted the deeds. Each deed reserved a one-sixty-fourth non-participat-
ing royalty.25 1 Lawyer Seabury took the lead in handling complicated
and protracted litigation for the next six years, and he eventually engi-
neered a global settlement that resulted in acquiring 21,000 acres for Ker-
lin. The Balli heirs got nothing.252
The jury verdict generally found that Kerlin acquired 7,500 acres for
the benefit of the Balli heirs, that Kerlin failed to comply with the fiduci-
248. Id. at 429.
249. 263 S.W.3d 920, 925, 928 (Tex. 2008).
250. 164 S.W.3d 892 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005), rev'd, 263 S.W.3d 920 (Tex.
2008).
251. Id. at 903-05.
252. Id. at 905-07.
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ary duty owed to each of the Balli heirs with respect to the royalty inter-
est reserved in the eleven deeds, that Kerlin and Seabury committed
fraud and breached Seabury's fiduciary duty in the settlement, and that
Kerlin was estopped to deny the validity of the deeds from the Balli
heirs.2 53 The Texas Supreme Court first considered "whether Kerlin's
fraudulent concealment of the Balli [heirs'] entitlement to royalty pay-
ments and the details of the [1942] settlement prevented [the statute of]
limitations from running. '"254
Kerlin argued the four-year statute of limitations barred the breach of
contract, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty claims, while the two-year
statute prevented the related conspiracy claims. Kerlin also claimed that
the Balli heirs "could have timely discovered the existence of their claims
through the exercise of reasonable diligence. ' '255 The supreme court
agreed with Kerlin's position because "[f]raudulent concealment will not
... bar limitations when a party discovers the wrong or could have discov-
ered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
256
In evaluating whether the claims could have been discovered, the su-
preme court reasoned by analogy from its opinion in HECI Exploration
Co. v. Neal.2 57 In HECI, oil and gas royalty owners sued their lessee for
failing to advise them of the lessee's successful suit against an adjoining
operator for damages to the common field. In that case, the Texas Su-
preme Court's opinion was somewhat vague, but it found that the royalty
owners could have discovered their possible claim by Railroad Commis-
sion records or visible operations on the adjoining property.25 8 In Kerlin,
the Texas Supreme Court carefully noted that the application of the dis-
covery rule was "categorical," and while the effect of fraudulent conceal-
ment in tolling limitations was not, HECI was "instructive.
25 9
The 1942 dismissal and "Kerlin's receipt of more than 20,000 acres in
fee simple and 1,000 mineral acres were a matter of public record more
than forty years before the Balli heirs filed [their] lawsuit." The Balli
heirs knew they were not getting any royalty, and they could have exer-
cised reasonable diligence, thus allowing them to discover the existence
of any claims before their claims were barred.260 The court said, "royalty
owners are not entitled to 'make ... no inquiry for years on end."261
The significance of the case is the holding that the tolling of the statute
by fraudulent concealment with respect to a mineral deed is essentially
resolved by the same inquiry that is required under the discovery rule.
262
253. Id. at 909.
254. Kerlin, 263 S.W.3d at 925.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. (citing HECI Exploration Co. v. Neal, 982 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1998)).
258. HECI, 982 S.W.2d at 886-87.
259. Kerlin, 263 S.W.3d at 925-26.
260. Id. at 926.
261. Id. at 925 (citing HECI, 982 S.W.2d at 887-88).
262. Id. at 925-26.
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All of the other issues in the case simply disappeared with the dispositive
ruling on limitations.
Four of the justices were not content to let it go with that. In the con-
curring opinion, they wrote that the court of appeals opinion generated
ninety-five headnotes, and every one of the legal concepts was misap-
plied.26 3 The concurring opinion then briefly addressed a number of in-
teresting oil and gas issues with ethical implications. First, the concurring
opinion noted that the transaction involving the mineral deeds was a
sale, 264 and Kerlin did not represent the Balli heirs,265 nor did Seabury. 266
"Like any other buyer, Kerlin owed his sellers (the heirs) no fiduciary
duty after buying their interests. '267 Moreover, in the court of appeals'
analysis, the fiduciary duty was derived from the duty owed by the holder
of executive rights to non-participating royalty owners in executing an oil
and gas lease, but Kerlin sold his interest and owed no duty to account for
the sale of his own interest.268 The court of appeals was also in error by
applying estoppel by deed. Estoppel by deed only applies to the grantor,
only as to after-acquired title, and does not apply to quitclaim deeds. 269
In the concurring opinion, the justices clearly expressed their concern at
the number of lawsuits being filed to upset South Texas land titles and the
court's intent to discourage that trend. 270
263. Id. at 928 (Brister, J., concurring).
264. Id. at 929.
265. Id. at 931.
266. Id. at 932.
267. Id. at 931.
268. Id. at 931-32.
269. Id. at 930-31.
270. Id. at 932.
1344 [Vol. 62
